Health and guardianship law: The boundaries of parental decision-making and the requirement to obtain court approval for 'special medical procedures': The recent decision of Re Jamie [2013] FAMCAFC 110 by Smith, Malcolm
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Smith, Malcolm K. (2013) The boundaries of parental decision-making and
the requirement to obtain court approval for "special medical procedures"
: the recent decision of Re Jamie [2013] FamCAFC 110. The Queensland
Lawyer, 33(3), pp. 182-187.
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/65661/
c© Copyright 2013 Please consult the author
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
The Queensland Lawyer: Health and Guardianship Law Section  
 
This editorial will be published in the Queensland Lawyer (2013) 33 Qld Lawyer 1  
THE BOUNDARIES OF PARENTAL DECISION-MAKING AND THE REQUIREMENT TO OBTAIN 
COURT APPROVAL FOR “SPECIAL MEDICAL PROCEDURES”: THE RECENT DECISION OF 
RE JAMIE [2013] FAMCAFC 110 
 
The Full Court of the Family Court of Australia has recently handed down its decision in the 
case of Re Jamie [2013] FamCACF 110. This is an important decision concerning the issue 
of parental consent for “special medical procedures” and more specifically, parental consent 
for the treatment of childhood gender identity disorder. As explained below, the reasoning 
adopted in the case is quite different to previous jurisprudence addressing this issue. 
Moreover, some questions remain about the impact that this case will have on other types of 
special medical procedure.  
 
The facts of the case and the issues on appeal 
 
The appeal in this case follows the decision of Dessau J in Re Jamie [2011] FamCA 248, 
which concerned an application by the parents of a 10-year-old child for the purpose of 
obtaining orders for the authorisation of treatment for gender identity disorder. The child, 
who was given the pseudonym “Jamie”, was born with male characteristics but had 
identified as female from a very early age and was known exclusively as a girl. Her parents, 
treating practitioners and the medical experts instructed in the case, were all in agreement 
that treatment should be commenced to treat Jamie’s gender identity disorder. The treatment 
involves the provision of drugs, which are administered in two stages. By the time the 
appeal came before the Full Court of the Family Court, the first stage of treatment was 
already underway; stage one of treatment for childhood gender identity disorder involves the 
administration of drugs to prevent the onset of male puberty. The second stage of treatment 
requires the administration of oestrogen, which causes the development of female 
characteristics including the development of breasts. At the time of the appeal, stage two of 
the treatment was not required, but was expected to commence once Jamie reaches the age 
of 16. 
 There were three issues raised on appeal, but only two of the grounds constituted 
substantive issues. The first ground of appeal in the case concerned the issue of whether 
treatment for the condition “childhood gender identity disorder” constitutes a special 
medical procedure to the extent that it is beyond the boundaries of parental consent. The 
second ground concerned a submission that the first ground should be considered on appeal, 
despite the fact that no submission was made in relation to this issue at first instance. As an 
alternative to the first ground of appeal, the third ground concerned a submission that the 
trial judge made an error in applying the law when determining that a further application 
should be made to the court to gain approval for the commencement of stage two of the 
treatment. 
 It was noted that the decision in this case has the potential to affect other children, in the 
event that it eliminated the need for the parents to make an application to the court for 
consent to the treatment. For this reason, a number of other parties were involved. At first 
instance, Dessau J appointed the independent children’s lawyer for Jamie. In addition to this, 
once the notice of appeal was lodged following the decision of the lower Court, the Appeals 
Registrar gave notice of the appeal to the relevant public authority. Although the public 
authority had declined to intervene at first instance, an application was filed seeking leave to 
intervene in the appeal (which was granted). Furthermore, it was noted during the course of 
the proceedings, that it would also be appropriate to involve a federal entity in the case. 
Therefore, upon invitation to the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth and the Australian 
Human Rights Commission (AHRC), the AHRC filed an application to intervene. 
 
Ground one of the appeal: Parental consent, medical treatment and “special medical 
procedures” 
 
The first ground of appeal required the court to consider the issue of parental consent for 
treatment of childhood gender identity disorder. By virtue of s 61C of the Family Law Act 
1975 (Cth), each parent of a child is vested with parental responsibility which includes “all 
the duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which, by law, parents have in relation to 
children”.1 It is generally accepted that parents have the authority to consent to medical 
                                                          
1 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 61B. 
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treatment on behalf of their children. However, there is a growing body of case law 
concerning specific types of medical treatment for which the courts have determined as 
falling outside the boundaries of parental consent. The reasoning adopted within this 
jurisprudence is based on the principles outlined in the High Court decision of Department 
of Health and Community Services (NT) v JWB (Marion’s Case) (1992) 175 CLR 218. In 
Marion’s Case, the High Court was asked to address the issue of whether the parents of a 
14-year-old girl, given the pseudonym “Marion”, could consent to the performance of a 
“non-therapeutic” sterilisation procedure. Marion suffered with disabilities, including severe 
deafness and epilepsy. It was determined that the proposed sterilisation procedure was not 
medically necessary, but was intended to prevent menstruation and pregnancy in order to 
control Marion’s hormonal stability and to improve her behavioural problems. In this 
landmark decision, the majority made reference to a number of principles to explain why the 
provision of consent in the circumstances of the case fell outside the boundaries of parental 
consent (at (49]): 
 
As a starting point, sterilisation requires invasive, irreversible and major surgery. But so 
do, for example, an appendectomy and some cosmetic surgery, both of which, in our 
opinion, come within the scope of a parent to consent to. However, other factors exist 
which have the combined effect of marking out the decision to authorise sterilisation as 
a special case. Court authorisation is required, first because of the significant risk of 
making the wrong decision, either as to a child’s present or future capacity to consent or 
about what are the best interests of a child who cannot consent, and secondly, because 
the consequences of a wrong decision are particularly grave 
 
 Based upon the reasoning in Marion’s Case there are a number of principles that can be 
referred to in order to establish why certain “non-therapeutic” medical procedures or 
interventions may require court approval. Thus, court approval may be required where: 
 
 there is a significant risk of making the wrong decision without the involvement of the 
 court; 
 the procedure in question has particularly grave consequences; 
 the procedure is irreversible and invasive; and, 
 there is potential for conflict in terms of the interests of the parties involved (eg the 
 parents, clinicians, and the patient). 
  
 These factors have been considered and applied in a number of subsequent cases 
involving minors and specific types of medical procedures or interventions. This has 
included cases concerning gender reassignment surgery,
2
 hormone therapy for gender 
identity disorder,
3
 the harvesting of bone marrow,
4
 and in Queensland, the termination of 
pregnancy.
5
 
 Of particular significance is the fact that the previous authorities dealing with treatment 
for childhood gender identity disorder have addressed both stages of the treatment regime 
together.
6
 Until this recent judgment, the authorities did not distinguish between stage one 
and stage two of treatment. However, their Honours in Re Jamie chose to distinguish the 
most notable case on this topic: Re Alex: Hormonal Treatment for Gender Identity 
Dysphoria (2004) 180 FLR 89; FLC 93-175 (Re Alex). Thus, Bryant CJ observed that the 
court in Re Alex was “was asked not to view the reversible first stage [of treatment] in 
                                                          
2 Re A (a child) (1993) 16 Fam LR 715; FLC ¶92-402. 
3 Re Alex: Hormonal Treatment for Gender Identity Dysphoria (2004) 180 FLR 89; FLC ¶93-175. 
4 Re W (1997) 136 FLR 21; FLC ¶92-748. However, note that this position was challenged in Re Inaya (Special Medical 
Procedure) (2007) 38 Fam LR 546. 
5 State of Queensland v B [2008] QSC 231. This position has been heavily criticised: see See White B and Willmott L, 
‘Termination of a Minor’s pregnancy: Critical Issues for Consent and the Criminal Law” (2009) 17 JLM 249. Kerridge, Lowe, 
and Stewart have similarly criticised this position, observing that: “Wilson J found that abortions must be consented to by the 
court because they are non-therapeutic treatments. But the Queensland law makes abortion illegal unless it is to protect the life 
and health of the mother … By definition, the only abortions that can be provided at law in Queensland are therapeutic which, 
in turn, means that they do not need to be reviewed by a court”: Kerridge I, Lowe M, and Stewart C, Ethics and Law for the 
Health Professions (4th ed, The Federation Press, Sydney, 2013) p 595. 
6 It should be noted that the issues dealt with in this recent case have been contemplated by other decisions of the Family Court 
in the context of treatment for childhood gender identity disorder. Thus, in Re Jodie [2013] FamCA 62, Dawe J noted that there 
may be some distinctions drawn by the law in terms of whether the different stages of treatment for gender constitute special 
medical procedures requiring the approval of the court. 
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isolation from the second stage, which could have irreversible consequences” (at [81]) but to 
view the two phases together as a single treatment plan. In addition to this factual difference, 
a further distinguishing factor highlighted in the case was that Re Alex addressed the issue of 
whether a government department could provide consent to treatment for gender identity 
disorder, under the scope of an operative care order (see Finn J, at [173]). Thus, the issue in 
Re Alex did not concern the provision of consent by a parent (or parents) with parental 
responsibility (at [77]). Despite these differences, Bryant CJ placed emphasis on establishing 
the nature of the treatment in question; her Honour paid particular regard to the fact that 
stage one of the treatment is reversible and stage two is not. Moreover, her Honour also 
observed that there is lesser scope for conflicting interests between the parties involved: “it 
is unlikely that the parental interests [in the context of Jamie’s treatment] would be anything 
other than the welfare of the child (as opposed to having a collateral interest in having the 
treatment carried out)” (at [107]). The court’s reasoning in Re Jamie is therefore 
underpinned by the factors outlined in Marion’s Case, as listed above. Importantly, these 
factors were relied upon to reach the conclusion that phase one of treatment for gender 
identity disorder does not constitute a special medical procedure. As observed by Finn J, 
“given that stage one of the treatment is reversible, the concerns of the High Court majority 
in relation to the risks of a wrong decision and resulting grave consequences do not arise” 
(at [179]). This means that phase one of the treatment does not require court approval. 
 What is particularly interesting about the recent decision in Re Jamie, is that despite 
relying heavily upon the factors outlined in Marion’s Case, it was determined that the 
treatment in question was of a therapeutic nature. This demonstrates a change in reasoning 
compared to the case of Re Alex, where Nicholson CJ stated: “[t]o my mind, their Honours 
[in Marion’s Case] were seeking … to distinguish medical treatment which seeks to address 
disease in or malfunctioning of organs”.7 Given that the treatment in Re Alex was intended to 
treat a recognised psychological disorder and not “disease or malfunctioning of organs”, the 
treatment was deemed “non-therapeutic” in that case. Bryant CJ did not agree with this 
position, stating that (at [97]) she saw: 
 
no reason to limit [the observations made in Marion’s Case] to a physical disease, 
particularly as Brennan J directly addressed the application of the principle to 
psychiatric disorders and considered it therapeutic provided the treatment is appropriate 
for and proportionate to the purpose for which it is administered. 
 
This led her Honour to conclude (at [98]) that: 
 
where the question is whether the treatment relates to a disease or malfunctioning of 
organs, including psychological or psychiatric disorders, then, in my view, if the 
treatment is in response to a disorder, even a psychological or psychiatric one, it is 
administered for therapeutic purposes. For that reason alone, in my view, the treatment 
at stage one for gender identity disorder would not fall within the category of cases 
which the High Court was considering in Marion’s Case. 
 
 One further observation that was made about whether treatment for childhood gender 
identity disorder constitutes a special medical procedure, was that the condition was 
considered to be novel when the case of Re Alex was decided in 2003; an approach that 
Byrant CJ deemed to be “no longer supportable” today (at [99]). 
 
Ground three of the appeal: Phase two of treatment for gender identity disorder and the 
need to seek approval by the court 
 
As outlined at the beginning of this editorial, the second ground of the appeal in Re Jamie 
concerned the issue of whether the court would be willing to accept the appellants’ first 
submission concerning ground one of the appeal. This was obviously the case; as outlined 
above, the court addressed the first ground in detail. Therefore, the second ground of appeal 
did not concern an issue of substance. 
                                                          
7 Re Alex: Hormonal Treatment for Gender Identity Dysphoria (2004) 180 FLR 89; FLC 93-175 at [195]. 
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 The court then addressed the third ground of the appeal concerning the issue of whether 
stage two of the treatment should be the subject of a further application to the court prior to 
its commencement. It was observed (at [110]) that as:  
this ground is couched in the alternative, it could potentially be disposed of on the basis 
that the appellants have been successful in relation to Ground 1. However, there is 
implicit in the ground an assumption that stages one and two should be dealt with 
together. Thus Ground 3 is not really in the alternative but is an adjunct to Ground 1; 
that is, whatever finding the court makes, stages one and two should be treated together.  
 
 The court determined that there is a significant difference between the two phases of 
treatment so that they should not be considered together: “[t]he complete reversibility, with 
few, if any, side effects, of stage one is a significant issue. Stage two is acknowledged to be 
different” (at [111]). Bryant CJ concluded that phase two of the treatment constitutes a 
special medical procedure, based on the effects of the treatment, as outlined by the trial 
judge. Thus, Dessau J noted that phase two of the treatment would cause feminisation of the 
body (including breast growth), stimulate a marked increase on bone mineral density, have 
effects on growth plates in the long bones which will promote the eventual closure of the 
growth plates, and that the treatment would cause Jamie’s height to be about three or four 
centimetres shorter than if male puberty had been completed.
8
 Moreover, Dessau J’s 
decision to require Jamie’s parents to make a further application to the court for 
authorisation of stage two of the treatment, was based on the fact that it was not possible to 
make such an assessment six years in advance; her Honour was of the view that it was not 
possible to determine Jamie’s welfare this far in advance.9 For this reason, Bryant CJ agreed 
with the approach adopted by the trial judge in relation to stage two of the treatment. 
 
A further issue considered by the court: Phase two of the treatment, court approval, and 
Gillick competency  
  
There is a further issue raised in this case that makes it stand out from previous authorities. 
Whilst it may seem logical (based on the above reasoning) to conclude that court 
authorisation is necessary for the commencement of phase two of the treatment in the event 
that the child lacks capacity, the court also raised the issue of how the law should respond in 
the event that the child is Gillick competent. Thus, the question arises: can a Gillick 
competent minor provide consent to stage two of the treatment which is classed as a special 
medical procedure? The term Gillick competency is derived from the English case of Gillick 
v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] 1 AC 112, where the House of 
Lords held that a mature minor – who is in law presumed to lack capacity – may provide 
consent to his or her own treatment in the event that he or she possesses a sufficient level of 
maturity and understanding in relation to a particular form of treatment.
10
 
 Submissions made by the AHRC outlined the relevance of provisions contained within 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities, particularly the provisions concerning the obligation to give due 
weight to the views of children who are capable of forming their own decisions concerning a 
particular matter. These provisions were influential on the court’s reasoning, based on the 
question posed by the public authority that intervened in the case. Thus, the public authority 
questioned whether the court has jurisdiction in respect of the treatment if a child is deemed 
Gillick competent (at [125]). It was held that where the child is Gillick competent, then the 
court has no role in determining the issue of consent to the treatment (at [134]). Bryant CJ 
stated (at [134]): 
 
In my view, it would be contrary to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and to 
the autonomous decision-making to which a Gillick competent child is entitled, to hold 
                                                          
8 See Re Jamie [2011] FamCA 248 at [60] and [84]. 
9 Re Jamie [2011] FamCA 248 at [130]. 
10 It was observed in Secretary Department of Health and Community Services v JWB (Marion’s Case) (1992) 175 CLR 218 
that the Gillick principle is likely to apply in Australia. This position is endorsed by legislation in South Australia in the form of 
s 6 of the Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA), which provides that a person over the age of 16 
can provide consent to medical treatment. Similarly, in New South Wales, s 49(2) of the Minors (Property and Contracts) Act 
1970 (NSW) provides that children over the age of 14 are able to consent to medical and dental treatment. For children below 
the ages outlined in the statutory provisions, the Gillick principle continues to apply in the same way that it applies to all 
minors in other Australian jurisdictions. 
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that there is a particular class of treatment, namely stage two treatment for childhood 
gender identity disorder, that disentitles autonomous decision-making by the child, 
whereas no other medical procedure does. 
 The appellants in Re Jamie also addressed the issue of Gillick competency in their oral 
submissions to the court, stating that the assessment of Gillick competency is a matter that is 
ordinarily decided by the clinician, and that the court only becomes involved where there is 
dispute surrounding the issue of whether the child possesses the requisite level of 
understanding and maturity (at [117]). However, despite reaching the conclusion that the 
court has no role to play in deciding whether the treatment should be administered in the 
event that the child is deemed Gillick competent, the issue of whether the child possesses 
such competency is a matter that requires the involvement of the court. Thus, as observed by 
Bryant CJ: “[t]he second and more vexing question posed is who should determine the 
question of Gillick competence” (at [136]). Her Honour answered this question by stating 
that “the nature of the treatment at stage two requires that the court determine Gillick 
competence” (at [137]). It was further observed that it may appear burdensome to require the 
parents to be subject to the expense, inconvenience, and stress of making an application to 
the court, but that the application would only need to address the question of Gillick 
competency and once this is established, the court would have no further role to play in the 
issue (unless of course, it is determined that the child is not Gillick competent) (at [138] and 
[139]). The same conclusion was also reached by Finn J (at [186] and [188]) and Strickland 
J (at [196]). 
 
Comment 
 
The decision raises a number of questions about the categorisation of treatments as special 
medical procedures and the involvement of the courts in relation to such treatments. On first 
reading, it could be stated that the conclusion that stage one of treatment for childhood 
gender identity disorder is a logical one, based on the factors outlined in Marion’s Case. 
However, the question arises: was it necessary for the court to address these factors at all? 
The majority in Marion’s Case made it clear that they were not referring to a medical 
procedure (in that case, sterilisation) that is carried out to treat some malfunction or disease, 
thus suggesting that their reasoning does not apply to cases which are deemed to be 
“therapeutic” (although it should be noted that they expressed some reluctance in making the 
distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic treatments). However, in Re Jamie their 
Honours relied upon the reasoning of Brennan J in Marion’s Case, who considered the 
definition of “therapeutic” to encompass treatments for psychological disorders or 
pathological conditions. On this basis, it was concluded that the treatment in Jamie’s case 
was therapeutic. Arguably, if the treatment is deemed to be therapeutic, it could be stated 
that the court has no authority to narrow the boundaries of parental decision-making in the 
way that it did, as the classification of the treatment as therapeutic was itself a critical factor 
in distinguishing the case from previous jurisprudence on special medical procedures.
11
 In 
fact, the reasoning of Bryant CJ seems to support this view. For example, upon concluding 
that the treatment in the case should be classed as therapeutic, she states: “[f]or that reason 
alone, in my view, the treatment at stage one for gender identity disorder would not fall 
within the category of cases which the High Court was considering in Marion’s Case” (at 
[98], emphasis added). If this is the case, the question remains, why were the other factors 
outlined in Marion’s Case relevant? Furthermore, it could be stated that logically, the same 
argument would also extend to the second stage of treatment. If stage one of the treatment 
for childhood gender identity disorder is considered to be therapeutic, based on the fact that 
it is intended to treat a psychological disorder, then stage two of the treatment would also be 
deemed to be therapeutic as it is intended to treat the same condition. With respect, their 
Honours seem to overlook this point in their judgments. 
 More concerning is the requirement to involve the court in relation to the issue of 
assessing Gillick competency. This requirement is underpinned by the reasoning that there is 
a risk of a clinician wrongly assessing the capacity of a minor and that the consequences of a 
wrong decision could be grave (see Bryant CJ, at [137]). However, it is worth noting that the 
majority in Marion’s Case were concerned about the risk of wrongly assessing capacity 
based on an intellectual disability; a factor which, they feared, may result in assumptions 
being made within the medical profession (and also more generally) that those with 
                                                          
11 See eg, Re Baby A [2008] FamCA 417, and Re Baby D (No 2) [2011] FamCA 176, where the Family Court of Australia 
determined that particular interventions or procedures classified as “therapeutic” were not classed as special medical 
procedures. 
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intellectual disabilities lack capacity for all health care matters. The risk of wrongly 
assessing capacity in Re Jamie was not based on the same range of factors underlying the 
decision in Marion’s Case. It could therefore be argued that the decision in Re Jamie 
concerning the assessment of Gillick competency seems to be motivated by a concern that, 
because the treatment is irreversible and therefore potentially grave, the court should be 
involved so that it can be absolutely sure that the wrong decision is not in fact being made.  
 Finally, a further question arises surrounding the issue of assessing Gillick competency, 
as outlined in Re Jamie. Does the requirement to have a mature minor’s capacity assessed by 
the court extend to other types of special medical procedure? For example, would the 
decision in Re Jamie require the court to assess whether a mature minor is Gillick competent 
prior to enabling her to consent to a termination of pregnancy procedure (which is classified 
as a special medical procedure in Queensland)? These issues will, no doubt, require 
clarification in future decisions addressing special medical procedures. 
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